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Abstract : The paper at hand offers an analysis of all Android contact tracing apps deployed
hitherto by European countries. Each app was closely scrutinised both statically and dynamically
by means of dynamic instrumentation. The results reported from static analysis include permis-
sions, API calls, and possible connections to external URLs. Dynamic analysis collected data
pertaining to Java classes, network traffic, and intents. We present several key findings regarding
static analysis. On the other hand, due also to the fact that we utilised virtual machines to run
the apps, the dynamic analysis did not yield significant results and is to be further addressed in
future work.
1 Introduction
Digital contact tracing mobile apps have emerged as an invaluable weapon in the hands of gov-
ernments worldwide in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and novel epidemics in general.
Very quickly, a number of digital contact tracing architectures have been proposed, while even
Google and Apple have aligned their forces to develop a common privacy-preserving contact tracing
framework API based on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [1].
In the meanwhile, the topic of digital contact tracing has received considerable attention in the
literature. In the following, we only refer to works that are pertinent to ours leaving out others that
are mostly concerned with frameworks and user privacy matters. Hyunghoon et al. [2] focus on the
Singapore’s TraceTogether App and compare its characteristics against four alternative contact
tracing systems, namely polling-based model, polling-based model with mixing, the use of a public
database, and the exploitation of a private messaging system. They concentrate on the required
computational infrastructure per system and on user privacy by considering a semi-honest model.
Raskar et al. [3] outlined the different technological approaches to mobile-based contact tracing
and elaborated on the risks that these technologies may pose to individuals societies. Furthermore,
the authors proposed security enhancing approaches that can mitigate certain risks.
Nadeem et al. [4] presented a detailed overview of the contact tracing architectures as well as
its privacy and security issues. Furthermore, the authors surveyed several contact tracing apps
and analysed their privacy and security impact. Their work relies on public information about
existing tracing apps, and the authors’ comprehension of the relevant protocols being developed
for upcoming apps. Jinfeng [5] et al. presented a short survey of the various data regulations and
technology protocols for contact tracing apps as well as a global overview of contact tracing app
deployment. Lately, Martin et al. [6] contributed a comprehensive review of both the emerged
contact tracing architectures and the contact tracing apps that have been already deployed by
European countries. The discussion related to the apps is done in a high-level manner, i.e., their
installation and functionality, without touching on code analysis.
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Our contribution: This paper aims at scrutinising both the visible and under-the-hood func-
tionality of the already deployed Android contact tracing apps by European countries. This effort
is dynamic and constant given that the apps are frequently updated. As seen in table 1, up to
now, fourteen apps are available. Our focus is on promoting best practices that facilitate the min-
imisation of the attack surface and prevent data leakage. We deliver hands-on results stemming
from a full-spectrum static analysis, and in addition, we identify (i) potentially privacy-invasive
APIs and (ii) possible connections to external URLs, i.e., not API-related URLs that the app
might try to connect to. On top of that, all apps have been dynamically analysed by means of
dynamic instrumentation. The coarse result in this case is not significant, that is, we did not
noticed any strange or covert behaviour. However, given that dynamic instrumentation basically
depends on method hooking, and therefore needs intensive interaction with the running app, the
aforementioned result can only be considered as sketchy and more work is needed to examine and
understand the exact behaviour of the code.
Given the above, to the best of our knowledge, the work at hand is the first to elaborately profile
the behaviour of each app after delving into its code both statically and dynamically. That is, in
contrast to our work, all previous contributions in the literature deal with the security, privacy,
or usability characteristics of the various deployed apps based on information made available in
the app’s website or elsewhere. On top of that, in view of the fact that the great majority of apps
exploit the Apple/Google framework [1], we position each of them vis-a`-vis a baseline privacy
policy stemming from the aforementioned framework.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section details on the methodology
used. Section 3 outlines a baseline privacy policy based on the Apple/Google framework API.
Section 4 presents the results per app, while section 5 wraps up some key findings. The last
section concludes and provides pointers to future work.
App name Country Analysed version Latest version Downloads Score
Stopp Corona Austria 1.2.0.12 2.0.3.1057 100K+ 3.5/2,749
ViruSafe Bulgaria 1.0.32 1.0.32 100K+ 2.9/1,276
CovTracer Cyprus 2.0.1 2.0.2 1K+ 4.1/11
eRouska Czech Republic 1.0.437 1.0.437 100K+ 3.7/1,946
StopCovid France 1.0.0 1.1.0 1M+ 2.8/8,611
Corona-Warn-App Germany 1.0.4 1.1.1 5M+ 3.3/68,272
VirusRadar Hungary 1.0.0 1.0.0 10K+ 3.6/166
Immuni Italy 1.0.0 1.3.0 1M+ 3.8/24,428
Apturi Covid Latvia 1.0.47 1.0.47 50K+ 3.5/722
Smittestopp Norway 1.2.0 1.3.0 100K+ 2.2/2,123
ProteGO Poland 3.0.3 4.2.2 100K+ 3.1/1,282
ZostanZdravy Slovakia 1.1.0 Google Play URL seems dead - -
SwissCovid Switzerland 1.0.1 1.0.7 500K+ 3.7/2,669
NHS COVID19 UK 1.0.0.223 No longer available 50K+ -
Table 1: Outline of the examined apps (data collected from Google Play on July 27, 2020
2 Methodology
The apps were collected from the Google Playstore [7]. Each of them has been statically anal-
ysed following the step-by-step procedure illustrated in Figure 1. Particularly, the corresponding
Android Package (APK) archive has been extracted and then decompiled using the apktool [8].
Next, (a) the manifest file has been unpacked and compared against the baseline policies given in
section 3, and (b) the API calls have been retrieved from the smali files. The results have been
cross-checked via the Androtomist tool [9]. At the bare minimum, this kind of analysis provides
insight on whether the app:
1. Follows the least privilege principle regarding permissions.
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2. Might trigger privacy-sensitive or “risky” operations as designated by the Android API [10].
Figure 1: High-level static analysis procedure
Code instrumentation, i.e., method hooking, was exploited for dynamic analysis using the
Androtomist tool [9]. A current limitation is that we utilised Virtual Machines (VMs) to run the
apps, so several of them did not run properly as they required a SIM card and/or GPS module. For
the apps that did run, the features collected pertain to Java classes, network traffic, and intents.
The UI/App exerciser Monkey [11] was exploited by Androtomist to run each app with a setting
of 10K events. A complete analysis using a smartphone instead of a VM is currently underway,
but based on the data already collected, a general initial conclusion is drawn in section 5.
In the following, we detail on the instrumentation code fed to Androtomist. Code Listing
1 offers an example of the instrumentation code applied to log possible intents triggered during
app runtime. Precisely, the code hooks the constructors of the class android.content.Intent, which
is used by Android apps to trigger intents. On the other hand, listing 2 is an example of the
instrumentation code used to log Java classes related to network traffic, including all relevant
parameters, i.e., URLs, IPs, and network protocols. Representative instances of the data collected
from three apps are given in the appendix.
1 /*The primary pieces of information in intents are:
2 1. Action
3 The general action to be performed , such as
4 ACTION_VIEW , ACTION_EDIT , ACTION_MAIN , etc.
5 2. Data
6 The data to operate on, such as a person record in the contacts DB ,
7 expressed as a URI*/
8
9 Java.perform(function () {
10 var intent = Java.use("android.content.Intent");
11
12 // constructor Intent(String action)
13 intent.$init.overload(’java.lang.String ’).implementation=function(action)
14 {
15 console.log("action" + action);
16 }
17
18 // constructor Intent(Intent o)
19 intent.$init.overload(’android.content.Intent ’).implementation=function(o)
20 {
21 console.log("intent" + o);
22 }
23
24 // constructor Intent(String action , Uri uri)
25 intent.$init.overload(’java.lang.String ’, ’android.net.Uri’)
26 .implementation=function(action , uri)
27 {
28 console.log("action" + action + ", url" + uri);
29 }
30 ...
31 });
Listing 1: The instrumentation code used to hook intents
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1 // Objects to hook
2 var objects = ["java.net.Socket", "java.net.URLConnection", "java.net.URL", "java.
security.cert.X509Certificate"];
3
4 for (var i in objects) {
5 Java.perform(function () {
6 Java.choose(objects[i], {
7 "onMatch": function (instance) {
8 if (objects[i] == "java.net.URL" && instance.getProtocol () != "file") {
9 console.log("\n Process has Instantiated instance of: " + objects[i]);
10 console.log("\n Process is communicating via " + instance.getProtocol ());
11 console.log("\n Communication Details: " + instance.toString ());
12 }
13 if (objects[i] == "java.net.Socket") {
14 console.log("\n Process has Instantiated instance of: " + objects[i]);
15 console.log("\n Process is making use of a Socket Connection");
16 console.log("\n Socket Details: " + instance.toString ());
17 }
18 if (objects[i] == "java.net.URLConnection") {
19 console.log("\n Process has Instantiated instance of: " + objects[i]);
20 console.log("\n Process is making use of a URL Connection");
21 console.log("\n Details: " + instance.toString ());
22 }
23 if (objects[i] == "java.security.cert.X509Certificate") {
24 console.log("\n Process has Instantiated instance of: " + objects[i]);
25 console.log("\n Process is making use of a X509Certificate");
26 console.log("\n X509Certificate Details: " + instance.toString ());
27 }
28 },
29 "onComplete": function () {
30 }
31 });
32 });
33 }
Listing 2: The instrumentation code exploited to hook Java classes related to network traffic
Moreover, we provide an overall evaluation of the security level of the external network do-
mains each app may visit. This assessment was done with the aid of the “SSL Server Test” as
offered by Qualys SSL labs [12]. Specifically, as detailed in [13], this test thoroughly examines the
configuration of any TLS web server based on four axes, namely certificate, protocol support, key
exchange, and cipher strength. The results vary from A+ (best) to T (worse).
3 Baseline policy
Assuming the use of the “Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing” proposed by Apple/Google [1],
as a baseline, contact tracing apps based on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) require the following
permissions [14, 15]:
• android.permission.BLUETOOTH
• android.permission.BLUETOOTH ADMIN
• android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION. According to [14], the smartphone’s loca-
tion setting should be enabled: “The system uses this to scan for Bluetooth signals. The
system does not collect or track your location”
• android.permission.INTERNET
It is to be stressed out that possible deviations from the above mentioned baseline profile does
not mean that the corresponding app leaks personal data, and thus this set of permissions is only
to be considered as indicative.
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App BLU BLU.ADM AFL INTERNET
Stopp Corona 3 3 7 3
ViruSafe N/A N/A N/A N/A
CovTracer N/A N/A N/A N/A
eRouska 3 3 3 3
StopCovid 3 3 3 3
Corona-Warn-App 3 7 7 3
VirusRadar 3 3 3 3
Immuni 3 7 7 3
Apturi Covid 3 7 7 7
Smittestopp 3 3 3 7
ProteGO 3 3 3 3
ZostanZdravy 3 3 3 3
SwissCovid 3 7 7 3
NHS COVID19 3 3 3 3
Table 2: Overview of requested permissions per app vis-a`-vis the baseline. BLU, BLU.ADM,
and AFL stand for BLUETOOTH, BLUETOOTH.ADMIN, and ACCESS FINE LOCATION,
respectively)
As already pointed out, API calls per app have been also analysed. However, in this case,
instead of providing a baseline, which is considered impractical, we only identify in section 5
certain API calls that may pose a threat to user privacy. For example, such APIs include:
• android/hardware/Camera;→ open
• android/location/LocationManager;→ getLastKnownLocation
• android/telephony/TelephonyManager;→ getNetworkOperatorName
• android/telephony/TelephonyManager;→ getNetworkOperator
• android/telephony/TelephonyManager;→ getLine1Number
4 Analysis of apps
This section outlines all noteworthy results per app in regard to static analysis. Table 2 sum-
marises the requested permissions (android.permission.) per app with reference to the baseline
policy. All potentially privacy-invasive (“dangerous” according to the API) permissions along
with the security analysis of network domains the app might connect to are given in the respective
subsection.
4.1 Stopp Corona
The current app [16] requested for the 9 following additional permissions (android.permission.):
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,ACCESS WIFI STATE,CHANGE NETWORK STATE,CHANGE WIFI STATE,FO
REGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,REQUEST IGNORE BATTERY OPTIMIZATIONS,WAKE
LOCK. Also, it asked for the com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE permission. We
observe that the permission ACCESS COARSE LOCATION is potentially privacy-invasive as it
allows an app to access the approximate location of the device. Therefore, its protection level
according to API is defined as “dangerous”.
The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs: https://sms.
prod-rca-coronaapp-fd.net/api/v1/, https://app.prod-rca-coronaapp-fd.net/Rest/v7/.
Both the sms.prod-rca-coronaapp-fd.net and app.prod-rca-coronaapp-fd.net domains are
rated A+ by [12].
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4.2 ViruSafe
This app [17] does not rely on BLE for contract tracing, but on GPS. It asked for the following 7
android.permission. permissions: ACCESS FINE LOCATION,INTERNET,ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,
CAMERA,FLASHLIGHT,GET ACCOUNTS,USE CREDENTIALS.
Given that, the app requested for the following potentially privacy-invasive permissions, which
all have a “dangerous” protection level according to the API.
• ACCESS FINE LOCATION. Given the use GPS, this permission allows the app to access the
precise location of the device.
• ACCESS COARSE LOCATION as already explained.
• CAMERA given that provides access to the camera device.
• GET ACCOUNTS as it allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service.
The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs:
• https://www.paypal.com, https://twitter.com. Both these domains are rated A+ by
[12].
• https://www.linkedin.com. The domain www.linkedin.com is rated A by [12].
• https://www.facebook.com, https://accounts.google.com, https://login.live.com,
https://login.yahoo.com. All these 4 domains are rated B by [12].
• http://zxing.appspot.com/scan. This URL is not a https one, however the corresponding
webpage does not require any user input. The domain zxing.appspot.com is rated B by [12]
• http://google.com/books, http://books.google.com. Both these URLs are not https,
but are promoted to https. The domains google.com and books.google.com are rated B by
[12].
4.3 CovTracer
As with ViruSafe, this app [18] does not use BLE for contract tracing, but GPS. The app asked
for 17 android.permission. permissions as follows: BLUETOOTH,ACCESS FINE LOCATION,INTERNET
,BLUETOOTH ADMIN,WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE,ACCESS NETWORK STATE,ACCESS COARSE LOCATIO
N,ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION,WAKE LOCK,ACCESS LOCATION EXTRA COMMANDS,RECEIVE BOOT
COMPLETED,READ SYNC SETTINGS,WRITE SYNC SETTINGS,AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS,FOREGROUND
SERVICE,ACCESS WIFI STATE,READ APP BADGE.
It also requested for the following 20 additional permissions: com.google.android.gms.perm
ission.ACTIVITY RECOGNITION,com.android.vending.CHECK LICENSE,com.google.android.
c2dm.permission.RECEIVE,edu.rise.ihnilatis.permission.C2D MESSAGE,com.google.andr
oid.finsky.permission.BIND GET INSTALL REFERRER SERVICE,com.sec.android.provider.
badge.permission.READ,com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE,com.htc.la
uncher.permission.READ SETTINGS,com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE SHORTCUT,com.s
onyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST BADGE,com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVID
ER INSERT BADGE,com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE COUNT,com.majeur.launcher.
permission.UPDATE BADGE,com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE BADGE,com.h
uawei.android.launcher.permission.READ SETTINGS,com.huawei.android.launcher.permi
ssion.WRITE SETTINGS,com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ SETTINGS,com.oppo.launcher
.permission.WRITE SETTINGS,me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE COUNT READ,me.ev
erything.badger.permission.BADGE COUNT WRITE.
Given the above list of permissions, the following android.permission. ones are potentially
privacy-invasive as they are characterised as “dangerous” by the API:
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• ACCESS FINE LOCATION for the same reason as ViruSafe.
• WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE as it allows an app to write to external storage.
• ACCESS COARSE LOCATION as already explained.
• ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION as it allows an app to access location in the background.
The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs:
• https://twitter.com/intent/tweet. The domain twitter.com is rated A+ by [12].
• http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd. This URL is not a https one,
but is promoted to https. The domain www.w3.org is rated A+ by [12].
• http://logback.qos.ch/codes.html. This URL is not a https one, however the corre-
sponding webpage does not require any user input. The domain logback.qos.ch is rated B
by [12].
• https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php, https://plus.google.com/share, https:
//pinterest.com/pin/create/button/. The domains www.facebook.com, plus.google.com,
and pinterest.com are rated B by [12].
• http://xml.org. This URL is not a https one. The server’s certificate is not trusted, so
the domain xml.org is rated T by [12].
4.4 eRouska
This app [19] requested for the following 4 (android.permission.) permissions: ACCESS NETWOR
K STATE,FOREGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,android.permission.WAKE LOCK. In
addition, it asks for the com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE permission. As a result,
no privacy-invasive permission was observed for this app. The app might connect to the following
external, i.e., not API-related URLs: https://github.com and https://plus.google.com/.
The former is rated A+ and the latter B by [12].
4.5 StopCovid
The permissions (android.permission.) required by this app [20] are as follows: ACCESS COARSE L
OCATION,ACCESS NETWORK STATE,CAMERA,FOREGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,REQU
EST IGNORE BATTERY OPTIMIZATIONS,WAKE LOCK. In view of the above, ACCESS COARSE LOCATIO
N and CAMERA permissions are potentially privacy-invasive.
The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs: https://api.
stopcovid.gouv.fr, https://stopcovid.gouv.fr. Both of them are rated B by [12].
4.6 Corona-Warn-App
This app [21] requested for the following 5 (android.permission.) permissions: ACCESS NET
WORK STATE,CAMERA,FOREGROUND SERVICE,WAKE LOCK,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED. As already
pointed out, the CAMERA permission is potentially privacy-invasive. The app might connect
to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs: https://svc90.main.px.t-online.de,
https://submission.coronawarn.app, and https://verification.coronawarn.app. The first
domain is rated A+, while the rest are rated B by [12].
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4.7 VirusRadar
The current app [22] asked for the following 6 permissions: ACCESS NETWORK STATE,ACCESS C
OARSE LOCATION,FOREGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,REQUEST IGNORE BATTERY O
PTIMIZATIONS,WAKE LOCK. It also required the next 4 permissions: com.google.android.c2
dm.permission.RECEIVE,com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND GET INSTALL REFE
RRER SERVICE,com.huawei.permission.external app settings.USE COMPONENT,oppo.perm
ission.OPPO COMPONENT SAFE. As already explained, ACCESS COARSE LOCATION is potentially
privacy-invasive. The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs:
https://plus.google.com/, https://github.com/, https://f-droid.org/, and http://www.
amazon.com. The domain github.com is rated A+, while the domains f-droid.org, plus.google.com,
and amazon.com are rated B by [12].
4.8 Immuni
The following 4 android.permission. permissions were requested by this app: FOREGROUND SERVIC
E,ACCESS NETWORK STATE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,WAKE LOCK. The app might connect to the
external, i.e., not API-related URL https://get.immuni.gov.it. The domain get.immuni.gov.it
is rated A by [12].
4.9 Apturi Covid
The following 4 android.permission. permissions were requested by this app [23]: ACCESS NET
WORK STATE,WAKE LOCK,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,FOREGROUND SERVICE. It also required the
next 2 permissions: com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE,com.google.android
.finsky.permission.BIND GET INSTALL REFERRER SERVICE. The app might connect to the
external, i.e., not API-related URLs: https://www.facebook.com, https://accounts.google.
com, https://www.linkedin.com, and https://www.paypal.com. All these 4 domains are rated B
by [12].
4.10 Smittestopp
The 5 permissions (android.permission.) required by this app [24] are as follows: ACCESS BACKGROU
ND LOCATION,ACCESS NETWORK STATE,FOREGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,WAKE LO
CK. From them, ACCESS FINE LOCATIONandACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION are potentially privacy
invasive. As already mentioned, the former permission allows the app to access the precise location
of the device. This is because according to [25], this app uses GPS in conjunction to BLE: “(...)
collects the following data: (...) GPS position so that close contact with other people / mobile
phones can be traced. That is, movement patterns are continuously recorded (latitude, longitude,
speed, altitude, time at different locations) when Smittestopp is activated and the mobile phone
is switched on”.
The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs:
• https://pubapi.prod.corona.nntb.no/onboarding/register-device and https://pubapi.
prod.corona.nntb.no/permissions/revoke-consent. The domain pubapi.prod.corona.
nntb.no is rated A+ by [12].
• https://smittestopp.b2clogin.com/tfp/smittestopp.onmicrosoft.com/B2C_1A_phone_
SUS. The domain smittestopp.b2clogin.com is rated B by [12].
• https://login.microsoftonline.com and https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/
oauth2/v2.0/authorize. The domain login.microsoftonline.com is rated B by [12].
• https://smittestopp.onmicrosoft.com/backend/Device.Write. The domain smittestopp.
onmicrosoft.com cannot be resolved.
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4.11 ProteGO
The 6 permissions (android.permission.) required by this app [26] are as follows: ACCESS BACKG
ROUND LOCATION,ACCESS NETWORK STATE,FOREGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,REQU
EST IGNORE BATTERY OPTIMIZATIONS,WAKE LOCK. The app also requested for the com.google.a
ndroid.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE,com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND GET INST
ALL REFERRER SERVICE permissions. As mentioned, the ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION
is potentially privacy-invasive.
The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs:
• https://safesafe.app. The domain safesafe.app is rated A+ by [12].
• https://cdn.plot.ly/plotly-latest.min.js. The domain cdn.plot.ly is rated A by [12].
4.12 ZostanZdravy
The following 6 android.permission. permissions were requested by this app [27]: ACCESS NETWO
RK STATE,ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION,ACCESS WIFI STATE,FOREGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE B
OOT COMPLETED,WAKE LOCK.. Additionally, the app requested for the following permissions: com
.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE,com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIN
D GET INSTALL REFERRER SERVICE. From those, ACCESS FINE LOCATIONandACCESS BACKGROUND
LOCATION are potentially privacy-invasive. Especially for the former, and according to [28], this
app uses GPS in certain cases: “If the smartphone will recognize any other close Bluetooth device
and the contact will exceed particular time duration, the application will record dissipated GPS
position and anonymous log of both to the server”.
The app might connect to the external, i.e., not API-related URL https://t.mojeezdravie.
sk/api/v1/sygic/. The domain t.mojeezdravie.sk is rated B by [12].
4.13 SwissCovid
This app [29] requested for the following 5 (android.permission.) permissions: ACCESS NETWORK S
TATE,FOREGROUND SERVICE,RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,REQUEST IGNORE BATTERY OPTIMIZATION
S,WAKE LOCK.
The app might connect to the following external, i.e., not API-related URLs: www.pt1-t.
bfs.admin.ch, www.pt-a.bfs.admin.ch, https://www.pt.bfs.admin.ch/, https://codegen-
service.bag.admin.ch/. All these 4 domains are rated A by [12].
4.14 NHS COVID19
The current app [30] requested for the following 7 (android.permission.) permissions: ACCESS BA
CKGROUND LOCATION,ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,ACCESS NETWORK STATE,FOREGROUND SERVICE,R
ECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED,WAKE LOCK,WRITE INTERNAL STORAGE. It also asked for the com.googl
e.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE permission. As already explained, ACCESS BACKGROUND L
OCATION and ACCESS COARSE LOCATION are potentially privacy-invasive. The app might connect
to the external, i.e., not API-related URL https://github.com, which is rated A+ by [12].
5 Key findings
This section recaps in brief the results given in the previous one and rolls them up into key
observations. To ease the reader, we summarise all potentially privacy-invading permissions per
app in table 3.
Permissions
• ViruSafe and CovTracer do not rely on BLE for contact tracing, but on GPS. Naturally, for
these apps, the baseline policy given in section 3 does not apply.
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App Permission
Stopp Corona ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
ViruSafe ACCESS FINE LOCATION,ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,CAMERA,GET ACCOUNTS
CovTracer ACCESS FINE LOCATION,WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE,ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,ACCESS BACKG
ROUND LOCATION
eRouska NONE
StopCovid ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,CAMERA
Corona-Warn-App CAMERA
VirusRadar ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
Immuni NONE
Apturi Covid NONE
Smittestopp ACCESS FINE LOCATION,ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION
ProteGO ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION
ZostanZdravy ACCESS FINE LOCATION,ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION
SwissCovid NONE
NHS COVID19 ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION,ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
Table 3: Potentially privacy-invasive android.permission. permissions per app
App Number of URLs Domain rating Comments
Stopp Corona 2 A+ -
ViruSafe 10 A+, A, B Use of http URLs
CovTracer 7 A+, B, T Use of http URLs, For one domain the server’s
certificate is not trusted
eRouska 2 A+, B -
StopCovid 2 B -
Corona-Warn-App 3 A+, B -
VirusRadar 3 A+, B -
Immuni 1 A -
Apturi Covid 4 B -
Smittestopp 6 A+, B One URL is irresolvable
ProteGO 2 A+, A -
ZostanZdravy 1 B -
SwissCovid 4 A -
NHS COVID19 1 A+ -
Table 4: External URLs per app
• Smittestopp and ZostanZdravy use BLE in conjunction with GPS.
• eRouska, StopCovid, VirusRadar, ProteGo, ZostanZdravy, and NHS COVID19 use all the
four baseline policy permissions. Stopp Corona, Corona-Warn-App, and Smittestopp utilise
three baseline permissions, Immuni and SwissCovid two, and Apturi Covid only one. As
observed from table 3, from them, only Apturi Covid, Immuni, SwissCovid, and eRouska
require zero potentially privacy-invasive permissions.
• Regarding “dangerous” permissions, ACCESS COARSE LOCATION is exploited by 6 apps, ACCE
SS FINE LOCATION and ACCESS BACKGROUND LOCATION by 4 apps, CAMERA by 3 apps, and G
ET ACCOUNTS and WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE by 1 app.
• As observed from table 4, the code of all the apps contain at least one external, not API-
related, URL where the app might try to connect to. The security analysis of the domains
of these hyperlinks designate that most of them are classified in the range from A+ to B
according to [12]. A limited number of problems were noticed pertaining to the use of http
instead of https, untrusted server’s certificates, and irresolvable URLs.
• Some apps, including VirusRadar and ViruSafe use vendor specific permissions.
Potentially privacy-invasive API calls
• All apps but ViruSafe include android/location/LocationManager;→ getLastKnownLocatio
n, which gets the last known location, if any, from the given provider.
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• ViruSafe, StopCovid, Corona-Warn-App and Apturi Covid include android/hardware/Cam
era;→ open, which creates a new Camera object to access the first back-facing camera on
the device, if any.
• CovTracer includes (a) android/telephony/TelephonyManager;→ getNetworkOperatorNam
e, which returns the alphabetic name of current registered operator, (b) android/telephony/
TelephonyManager;→ getNetworkOperator, which returns the Mobile Country Code (MCC)
and Mobile Network Code (MNC) of the current registered operator, and (c) android/tele
phony/TelephonyManager;→ getLine1Number, which returns the phone number string for
line 1, e.g., the Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number (MSISDN) for a
GSM phone for a specific subscription.
• Apturi Covid includes android/hardware/Camera;→ takePicture, which triggers an asyn-
chronous image capture.
Preliminary results on dynamic analysis
• The results obtained are currently under scrutiny, but so far, no noteworthy peculiar be-
haviour has been observed.
6 Conclusions
The value of mobile digital contact tracing apps in swiftly and accurately identifying and alerting
individuals at risk is rather unquestionable. However, for such a privacy-sensitive app to gain
widespread adoption, certain security and data protection requirements need to be met. This paper
attempts to answer a basic question; do the currently deployed apps reduce their functionality to
the bare minimum? If so, user privacy is well-preserved, data protection is ensured, and the
attack surface is decreased. To answer this matter in a tangible way, we analysed all mobile
contact tracing apps currently deployed by European countries. The results stemming for static
analysis reveal a limited but not insignificant number of deviations in both the permissions of the
apps as well as the use of potentially privacy-invasive API calls by some of them. On the other
hand, also because of the use of VMs to run the apps, dynamic analysis did not yield significant
outcomes. In any case, dynamic analysis is further to be addressed by running each app on a real
smartphone rather on virtual machines.
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Appendix
StopCovid
Network traffic:
• Details: Socket[address=app.stopcovid.gouv.fr/148.253.97.95,port=443,localPor
t=57796]
• Details: Socket[address=app.stopcovid.gouv.fr/148.253.97.95,port=443,localPor
t=57794]
• Details: Socket[address=app.stopcovid.gouv.fr/148.253.97.95,port=443,localPor
t=57798]
VirusRadar
Intents:
• com.google.android.c2dm.intent.REGISTER
• com.google.android.gms.measurement.START
ZostanZdravy
Network traffic:
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42760]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42764]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42716]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42732]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42750]
• Details: Socket[address=covid-gateway.azurewebsites.net/23.97.214.177,port=44
3,localPort=53294]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42722]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42724]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42744]
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• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42752]
• Details: Socket[address=settings.crashlytics.com/172.217.22.35,port=443,local
Port=52864]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42746]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42754]
• Details: Socket[address=firebaseinstallations.googleapis.com/216.58.212.170,p
ort=443,localPort=42756]
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